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1. Introduction 
  Land market liberalizations - ranging from de-collectivization of agrarian reform 
cooperatives, provision of private property titles, and the elimination of legal restrictions 
over rental and sales transactions - have been implemented in many Latin American 
countries in the 1990￿s.  These policies have typically been part of broader programs of 
liberal reform that have attempted to fortify private markets in ways that enhance 
efficiency and equity outcomes.  Specifically, in rural Latin America where severe 
poverty and inequality persist, one core objective has been to break the strong link 
between land ownership and operation by facilitating market-led transfers (primarily via 
rentals) from the land rich to the land poor.  
Economic theory suggests several channels ￿ increased tenure security, reduced 
transaction costs, and increased credit supply - through which these market-oriented land 
reforms can promote greater investment, more land transfers, and more efficient use of 
available land (Boucher et al., 2004).  Despite their popularity and a well- established 
theoretical literature on property rights and investment, the effects of this latest round of 
titling and market friendly policies on the performance of Latin American land markets 
have received relatively little empirical attention (Olinto et al., 2000; de Janvry et al., 
2001), perhaps in part because of the scarcity of panel data that spans reform periods.   
    This paper addresses the empirical gap by deploying two such panel data sets 
from Honduras and Peru to estimate econometric models of the relationship between 
operational and owned land holdings pre and post land market liberalization efforts.  In 
short, we empirically examine the degree to which land liberalization policies have 
broken down the dependence of operational area on owned area by promoting more land  
 
rentals especially to relatively land-poor households.  The econometric approach also 
allows us to disentangle the impacts of changes in credit supply conditions from the 
changes in overall tenure security. 
  The current structure of the paper first introduces the country settings and data 
used to examine these issues.  An initial look at the descriptive statistics demonstrates for 
both Honduras and Peru that the proportion of households participating in land rental 
transactions increased significantly over the two time periods, but that the volume of land 
rentals remains quite low.  The econometric estimations done in this draft of the paper 
only for Peru show that ￿  
  2.  Country Settings 
  (a) Honduras 
  In Honduras, the Law for Modernization and Development of the Agricultural 
Sector (LMDSA) was enacted in 1992 and became operative in the middle of 1993
1.  It 
replaced the 1975 Agrarian Reform Law, thereby rescinding several key statutes 
including the commitment to eliminate minifundios (5 hectares or less), the prohibition of 
land rentals by beneficiaries of land reform, and the prohibition on sale of land 
adjudicated to cooperatives or parcels controlled by individuals in the cooperative.  The 
LMSDA also promoted the titling of land to individuals or couples holding ￿illegally 
occupied national lands￿ prior to 1989.  It also strengthened women￿s formal rights to 
hold and receive land (Deere and Leon, 2001) and obliged the government to facilitate 
land market transactions by improving the security of property rights and the titling and 
land registry process. 
                                                 
1 See Thorpe (2000) for a more in-depth description of the LMSDA in Honduras.  
 
Measures were also taken by the Honduran government to rationalize the rural 
financial sector by strengthening incentives for the private sector to assume a leadership 
role.  Specifically, rural interest rates were liberalized, and BANADESA, the state￿s 
agricultural development bank and the main source of formal credit for small farmers, 
was restructured through a reduction in personnel, an increase in lending rates to market 
levels, and a limit of $50,000 in the maximum loan size for a single borrower.  The aim 
was to stimulate commercial bank lending by deregulating interest rates and by ensuring 
that BANADESA, the government development bank, would not crowd out or repress 
private sector participation in rural financial markets.
2 
A major thrust of the LMDSA has been to reinvigorate the Land Titling Project 
(PTT) that had been promoted strongly in the 1980s but had diminished in the early 
1990s
3.  After initially operating in only seven of Honduras￿ eighteen departments, the 
National Agrarian Institute (INA) extended the PTT nationwide after the LMDSA.  
Approximately 50,000 titles with an average size of 11 hectares were granted between 
1983 and 1993, while over 100,000 titles averaging 8 hectares were granted in the post 
                                                 
2 While the Honduran government acknowledged the potential for credit market failures for small farmers 
and thus established the legal base for a rural credit fund and land bank, these two financial institutions 
have not yet materialized.  The World Bank and the European Community are currently operating pilot 
land bank programs to finance land purchase for small and landless farmers. 
3 The initial funding for PTT was provided by USAID.  See Nesman and Seligson  (1989) for a description 
of the initial project.  
 
reform years 1994 ￿ 2000.
4  In addition to extending the coverage of titling, INA also 
intensified efforts to collect the land debt from previous title recipients.
5 
  (b)Peru 
   While liberalization came relatively late to Peru, when it arrived it was perhaps 
the most radical example in the Americas.  The election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, 
signified a dramatic swing of the policy pendulum away from the previous Garc￿a 
administration’s economic populism towards stabilization, structural adjustment and 
market liberalization.  The changes in the agricultural sector were dramatic.  Price 
controls and the state monopoly over inputs were eliminated.  Financial liberalization 
occurred immediately - the elimination of interest rate controls was accompanied by the 
closing of the Banco Agrario in 1992.  Finally, in an effort to provide incentive to private 
investment, a new land law was passed, which included elimination of the maximum land 
size regulation and all restrictions on rental and sales transactions.  In addition, a large 
titling program was enacted in order to map and register every non-comunal parcel in the 
country.  All of these policies were aimed at activating land markets. 
  The Peruvian government maintained its ￿hands-off￿ credit market policy 
throughout most of the 1990’s.  Apart from channeling minimal amounts of subsidized 
credit to priority areas, the main policy implemented was to provide the legal foundation 
for rural credit unions (CRAC) and to strengthen the already existing municipal banks 
                                                 
4 Data on titles granted in the pre-reform period are from Salgado et. al. (1994).  Data for the post reform 
period were collected in interviews with INA officials in Tegucigalpa. 
5 The recipients of title to national lands paid two separate fees: a land purchase fee and a separate fee to 
cover administrative costs of the title.  Initially, recipients were offered the option of debt-finance, whereby 
they would repay the costs of the land and title over a 10-year period.  
 
(CMAC).  By 1997, it was clear that the formal rural financial market in Peru was 
experiencing some limited success.  Commercial banks had begun to increase loan 
volume to the small class of medium sized farmers, while the CRAC’s and especially 
CMAC’s had aggressively increased their loan and savings portfolios in the most 
agriculturally viable coastal valleys.  Credit markets in the highlands, however, continued 
to languish.   
  Development of the nascent financial market came to a dramatic halt in 1998, as 
the country simultaneously experienced a macroeconomic crisis and a severe El Niæo 
episode.  This was followed immediately by the political crisis that culminated in the 
fraudulent presidential elections and eventual flight to exile of Fujimori in 2000/2001.   
     Rural credit policy has now returned to center stage.  The Toledo administration 
recently yielded to pressure to re-establish an agricultural development bank 
(BANADES) - although the precise form is still being debated.  The proposed research 
comes at a time a critical moment for Peruvian policy and will hopefully contribute to a 
more informed policy approach to rural financial, land market, and development policies. 
 
3. Data Description 
 (a) Honduras Sample 
  In 2001, 850 producer households were surveyed in 5 departments in Honduras 
regarding the 2000 agricultural year.
 6  This sample can be broken into two distinct sub-
                                                 
6 A criterion for selection was that the household either owned or cultivated a parcel in the previous 
agricultural year.  Households were selected from the departments of Col￿n, IntibucÆ, Ocotepeque, Santa 
BÆrbara, and Yoro.  
 
samples:  panel and cross section.  Only the panel sample is used in this paper.  The panel 
households (500) originate from a study conducted in 1994 (Lopez  and Valdes, 2000) in 
which 450 farm households were interviewed to analyze the impacts of a initial land 
titling program.  The 2001 survey attempted to follow both these baseline households and 
the land they cultivated.  Of the original 450 baseline households, 362 were resurveyed.  
In addition, 138 ￿new￿ panel households were added via parcel transactions.  The value 
of this panel sample for examining the impacts of the LMDSA in Honduras is that it 
spans a seven year period starting with the year the modernization law was initially 
passed.  
(b) Peru Data 
  The Peru sample consists of a panel of 500 households interviewed in 1997 and 
again in 2003 in the north coast department of Piura.  In contrast to the Honduras sample, 
which includes a combination of rainfed and irrigated agriculture, the Peru sample is 
exclusively irrigated agriculture.
 7  The sample was randomly drawn from the four main 
agricultural valleys within the department and was stratified on farm size. 
  A unique feature of this region is that is one of the few coastal regions that 
contain significant land under control of peasant communities.  Until very recently, 
community members were granted individual usufruct right to land, while the community 
maintained ownership.  Thus, members were not legally allowed to rent community land 
to non-members, although in practice some rental did occur.  This status changed in 1999 
when the peasant communities opted to move towards private property rights, and 
members were granted individual, private land titles by the government￿s titling program.  
Again, this panel dataset offers pre and post-reform data, although in this case the span is 
                                                 
7 The Peruvian coast essentially a desert so that all agriculture is irrigated.  
 
somewhat shorter, with the initial wave predating the reforms by two years and the 
second wave providing a view of land rental markets four years later.   
4. Conceptual and Econometric Framework 
  The conceptual approach builds on Carter and Olinto (2003), and Olinto et al. 
(2000).  Assume a world of constant returns to scale agricultural technology and 
imperfect substitutability between family and hired labor.  If land and credit markets were 
perfect, heterogeneously endowed households would exchange land until the ratio of 
operated area to effective labor were equalized, thus ensuring full separability between 
the choice of how much area to operate and the household￿s endowment of owned land.  
Large landowners would rent out land, and small holders would rent in land until the rate 
of return across factors and households were equalized.  This represents an optimistic 
scenario perhaps hoped for by the implementers of the land market reforms.  In the pre-
reform environment, in contrast, legal restrictions or the fear of expropriation reduce the 
amount of land that relatively land abundant households are willing to supply to the rental 
(or sales) market and in the extreme fully link land owned with land operated.   
In the post reform setting, the relationship between owned and operated area for 
both land abundant and land scarce households also depends on their access to credit.  
Land scarce households, who face no risk of losing their land, will want to rent in land 
until the marginal returns to its factors are equalized.  If they are unconstrained in credit 
markets, they do so, and separability between area operated and owned is achieved.  
However, credit-constrained, land scarce households will be unable to afford to rent in as 
much land as they seek and, as a result, the area operated by these households will be 
increasing in their land endowment.  Non-separability will also hold for land abundant  
 
households if they are credit constrained, as they will rent out a larger fraction of their 
land to help finance on-farm production. 
  The econometric model is similar to the credit market disequilibrium model 
employed by Feder et. al. (1990) to examine the impacts of credit constraints on farm 
productivity.  Similarly, we use a Heckman approach to control for credit constraints in 
examining the impacts of how the relationship between owned and operated land has 
evolved following land market liberalization episodes.  More specifically, we examine 
the determinants of household participation in land rental market transactions in a second 
stage specification that is contingent on the household￿s credit market status.  
  The first stage of the model identifies constrained and unconstrained households 
using a probit specification, with credit rationing status as the dependent variable.  
Letting  i u i Z i C + = ’ * γ denote the unobserved difference between formal sector credit 
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While the potential for rationing in credit markets prevents us from knowing the value of 
excess demand, the survey instrument does permit us to classify households into those 
that are price rationed versus non-price rationed (liquidity constrained). 
  The second stage examines the determinants of land rental market participation.  
Let  it RI  be the area rented in by household i in period t, with t=0 for the pre-reform 
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where X1,it  X2,it  are vectors of exogenous variables which affect the demand for land 
rental including owned farm area, human capital and the appropriate inverse-Mills ratio; 
Zit is a vector of exogenous variables affecting both credit supply and demand; and  t , 1 β , 
t , 2 β , and  t γ  are the corresponding vectors of parameters to be estimated.  Finally, e1,it , 
e2,it , and ui,t are random disturbances assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, iid 
across households.  Note that the parameter vectors in this regression are subscripted by t, 
indicating that the parameters may be different in the pre and post reform periods. 
  A parallel structure is utilized for land area rented out, with  it RO  substituting for 
it RI .  The main substantive difference between the two regressions is that the supply of 
land rented out by a given household may be affected by the proportion of their land that 
is titled and thus more secure in its tenure status, while the demand for land is 
presumably not affected by similar concerns.  Otherwise, all of the land rental regressions 
include the amount of land owned, the household labor endowment, the amount of 
agricultural capital endowment of the household, and the age of the head of household. 
One other notable difference across the regressions is that the vector of exogenous 
variables should be distinct for constrained versus the unconstrained households.  
Specifically, liquidity should positively affect the demand for land rentals and negatively 
affect the supply of land rentals among constrained households but liquidity should have 
no impact on the land rental market choices of unconstrained households.   
  
 
5. Credit Rationing and Land Rental Market Activity ￿ Pre and Post Reforms 
  In Honduras, land rental market activity underwent two major changes following 
the reforms. First, participation on both sides of the rental market grew dramatically.  The 
proportion of households renting in land increased from 15% to 35%, while the 
proportion renting out land grew from 12% to 29%.  Second, the average amount of land 
rented out per participating household fell considerably, especially on the land rented in 
side of the market from 5 manzanas to 2 manzanas.  Thus, while land rental market 
activity became much more common among the respondents, the average amount of land 
rented fell almost as swifly, such that the net amount of land rented-in only increased by 
about 10%.  Moreover, the total share of cultivated land that is rented-in as of 2000 was 
only 7% among respondents in the sample, which means that despite the dramatic 
increase in land rental participation, there has been relatively little change in the 
relationship between land owned and operated in Honduras (Boucher et al. 2004). 
The data in Table 1 compare changes in land rental market activity for 
constrained and unconstrained households across the two time periods in Honduras.  Both 
types of households dramatically increased their propensity to both rent-in and rent-out 
land during the seven years.  However, credit constrained households increased their 
propensity to rent-in land at a faster rate, while credit unconstrained households increased 
their propensity to rent-out land at a higher rate.  Note also that the average area rented-in 
by credit constrained households fell from 2 manzanas in 1994 to 1.25 in 2001, which 
suggests that while land markets became more fluid, that the ability of the households to 
fully exploit increased access to land rentals was constrained by their lack of 
complementary access to credit.    
 
Similar data for Peru show that￿ TABLE 2￿ 
 
 
6. Determinants of Land Rental Activity in Honduras and Peru 
  The determinants of land rental activity are explored in this section.  Currently, 
the section reports only regression results for Peru.  The results for Honduras are pending.  
The variable description and means of the key regressors are reported in Table 3 for Peru.  
Note that the estimation strategy for the two-stage regression is done using the following 
procedure.  In each country and year, four separate cross-sectional Tobit regressions were 
run: (1) Rental demand for credit constrained households; (2) Rental demand for credit 
unconstrained households; (3) Rental supply for credit constrained households; and, (4) 
Rental supply for credit unconstrained households.  The regressors for each of the Tobit 
equations includes the appropriate inverse mills selection term from the first-stage probit 
on credit constrained data.  While the two-rental demand and two rental supply equations 
could be estimated simultaneously, we opted for the less efficient strategy of single 
equation estimation due to data limitations.  
  The probit results on credit constraints are reported in Table 4 for 1997 and 2003.  
The 1997 regression provides a number of significant coefficient estimates regarding the 
factors influencing credit constraints, while the 2003 do not (they are more tentative 
because of recent data compilation).  Drawing from the 1997 results primarily, we note 
that households tend to be constrained in their access to credit (non-price rationed) when: 
•   They lack title to their agricultural land; 
•   They have less in the way of agricultural assets; 
•   They are older;  
 
•   They have not had previous loans; and, 
•   They have problems with previous loan defaults. 
The land rental regressions (Tables 4 and 5) show the importance of credit 
constraints in distinguishing land rental outcomes in 1997 but less so in 2003.  Note that 
in both the rental demand and supply estimations for 1997 that the coefficient on liquidity 
is statistically significant and in the direction predicted by the conceptual framework 
discussed above.  Namely, for credit-constrained households, increased liquidity 
increases their demand for land rental and decreases their supply of land to rental 
markets.  The land rental regressions also show that for credit constrained households 
more owned land makes them significantly less likely to rent-in and significantly more 
likely to rent-out land.  Thus, credit constraints appear to also push them in the direction 
of operating less land than they might otherwise.  Combined with the fact that the credit 
constrained tend to be poorer (see Probit results), this means that credit market failures 
may tend to push land markets away from the more equalizing effect that they might 
otherwise have between the land abundant and land poor. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper examines empirical evidence from two countries in Latin America 
where policies aimed at activating land and credit markets were actively pursued in the 
1990s.  While the titling push and legal reforms supporting land market transactions 
appear to have activated rental activity especially in Honduras, muted improvements n 
rural credit access in Honduras and in Peru have limited the extent to which land rental 
markets can move significant amounts of land.  It appears that further improvement in  
 
land rentals especially among the land poor will require more attention to credit markets, 
and how they may constrain participation.  
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     Table  1      
    Land Rental Market Activity Among Credit Constrained  
    and Unconstrained Households - Honduras 1994, 2001 
                         (percent, land area is manzanas)   
            
        Credit Constrained       Credit Unconstrained 
            
Proportion of 1994 Sample  38%    62%   
         
Proportion of 2001 Sample  31%    69%   
         
Proportion Renting-in 1994  16%    13%   
         
Proportion Renting-in 2001  46%    30%   
         
Proprtion Renting-out 1994  10%    12%   
         
Proportion Renting-out 2001  24%    34%   
            
Ave. Area Rented-in 1994  2.01    8.58   
         
Ave Area Rented-in 2001  1.25    2.8   
         
Ave. Area Rented-out 1994  3.41    7.98   
         
Ave. Area Rented-out 2001  5.26    4.75   
                   
            
All land measures are conditional on participation in the market.   
 
 
Table 3. Variable Description for Peru 
Mean  Variable 




A_owned  Area owned by household (ha.)  5.1  4.4 
A_titled  Titled area owned by household (ha.)  3.4  3.5 
Liquid Pre-planting  liquidity  ($US)  1,707  909 
Agassets  Value of agricultural assets ($US)  2,320  846 
Ag_HH  Age of household head  51.7  56.9 
Ed_HH  Years schooling of household head  4.8  4.6 
N_perm  Number of household members with 
permanent, off farm job 
0.4 0.3 
Loanhist  Number of formal loans taken by household  1.9  2.4  
 
prior to survey year 
Default  Dummy taking value 1 if household had a prior 
default on formal loan 
0.2 0.2 
Adults  Number of adults in household  4.1  3.9 
Children  Number of children in household  1.7  1.3 
      
 
  
Table 4. Estimated Coefficients of Probit Model: Peru 
(Dependent variable is probability of being credit constrained) 
Estimated Coefficient 
(t-value)  Variable 
1997 2003 







































Table 5. Regression Coefficients for Second-Stage Switching Regression for Rental Demand: Peru 
(Dependent Variable is area rented in) 














Liquid  0.00051 
(2.97)  NA    0.000099 
(0.86) 
NA   
Adults  -0.57 
(-0.82)  NA    0.039 
(0.145) 
0.32 
(0.71)   
Children  -0.37 
(-0.67)  NA    0.035 
(0.12) 
-0.29 
(0.42)   




  -0.138 
(-0.425) 
-0.57 
(-1.56)   
A_titled  -  -    0.134 
(0.52) 
-   




  -0.00059 
(-0.26) 
0.0017 
(0.87)   




  -0.65 
(-1.99) 
-0.16 
(-0.25)   




  3.6 
(2.64) 
12.9 
(1.6)   
Note: For 2003, constrained:  Could not get convergence without A_titled 
Note: For 2003 unconstrained: Could not get convergence if exclude Adults and Children and A_titled. 
 
Table 6. Regression Coefficients for Second-Stage Switching Regression for Rental Supply: Peru 
(Dependent Variable is area rented out) 














Liquid  -0.00029 
-(1.81)  NA     0.00032 
(2.4) 
NA   
Adults  -0.1 
(-0.52)  NA    -0.52 
(-1.15) 
-0.34 
(-0.67)   
Children  0.049 
(0.28)  NA    -0.32 
(-0.93) 
0.44 
(0.59)   




  0.16 
(1.2) 
-0.71 
(-0.39)   




  -0.00043 
(-0.64) 
-0.0012 
(-0.30)   




  -0.013 
(-0.57) 
0.069 
(2.04)   




  5.5 
(2.60) 
17.8 
(4.5)   
Note: For 2003, constrained:  Could not get convergence without A_titled  
 
Note: For 2003 unconstrained: Could not get convergence if exclude Adults and Children and A_titled. 
 